I promise in the Hello World post at the top of this blog that the blog would be an attempt to gather at least some of my disparate posts online in one place. In this spirit, let me share here that I was intrigued by this review in the Economist and this post by Paul Romer enough to buy Hidalgo’s book. Since promising to blog about it here might help motivate me to read it soon (by creating some time carved out from my time on social media, which I know I should be doing much more), I hereby promise to blog about this book soon.
Author: cogiddo
Nicholas Stern asks “why are we waiting?”
This is the title of Professor Stern’s recently published book. Following up on my previous post from today, I just got this book and Hirofumi Uzawa’s Economic Theory and Global Warming. So I am happily ensconced reading up on this topic, which I consider the most important topic for anyone, especially any economist, to learn about and contribute what s/he can to saving the future of humanity from catastrophe. Don’t just read the recently ubiquitous dystopias out there. Read also the suggestions of the people who have thought long and hard about how to navigate to eutopias instead. (No, it’s not a typo: eutopia is quite the opposite of dystopia in Greek, and different from utopia, as eutopia is attainable.)
Meanwhile, if you want a shorter presentation of Stern’s points in Why Are We Waiting? there is a way: you can watch the recent lecture Stern gave at LSE, and/or read the slides used in that lecture.
Climate economics
Do you need a reason to be even more depressed than when reading the news from Greece? No? I am sorry to disappoint you, but I have just such a thing. I have such news and I will start here a sequence of posts that will describe the situation from my point of view and look very hard for a policy that we puny humans can follow to avoid destroying the future of our children.
It has been pretty obvious to climate scientists that human activity is changing the Earth’s climate at a scary rate. Even the Pope recently said that recently, but ruled out the one solution that has a chance of success: carbon pricing.
I understand why people are suspicious of the proposals of economists, especially since economists in the past often understated the instability of markets, especially financial ones, that bit our behinds starting in 2007 and still threatens major catastrophe to the world’s economies, rich and poor alike. It would be nice to think that voluntary actions, undertaken worldwide, will be enough to mitigate the coming climate disaster. It also would be dangerous daydreaming.
The reason is the old bugaboo of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. I wrote about that not too long ago, in a post about capturing birds (here) where I also connected the environment more generally to the bleak implications of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. (If you think the works of Ostrom mentioned in that post can help, consider that the climate change problem is world-wide, while the examples of communities handling tragedies of the commons that she found were small in scale. Getting the whole planet to agree and act is the problem I am focusing on here.)
Today I want to point you in the direction of two lucid contributions by thoughtful economists, who point out that the voluntary actions never come at the needed level, and pricing carbon worldwide is the one policy that, obvious as it is to economists, has not been tried. Everything that has been tried, such as the Kyoto protocol, has failed.
The first contribution is in this PBS post by Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman. They argue that we are foolish not to insure against ecological catastrophe of gigantic proportions, and the way to insure is by means of pricing carbon.
The second is a collective effort with a well-named website. There you can find links to papers written for a special journal issue coming out in September. The papers are free to download. While they are written by economists (including Nobel prize winners Joseph Stiglitz and Jean Tirole) and thus are not literary masterpieces, they are clear enough about what humanity needs to do and have practical suggestions on how to get to it by international negotiations.
I will return to this topic soon. Meanwhile, read on, my friends.
Jeffrey Sachs on the failure of EU governance
As the EU is on the verge of throwing Greece out (bath water, follow baby), Jeffrey Sachs has published an excellent critique of EU governance.
Market Power versus Price-taking in Economic Growth
I was traveling when Paul Romer’s “mathiness” paper and blog post started a debate about how economic theory built with mathematical tools can be manipulated for purposes that are more political than scientific. There has been a ton of discussion about this, and for now I want to highlight this piece by Dietz Vollrath. If you assume that the relevant production function is well-defined and differentiable, his arguments make many things about this controversy very clear.
Meanwhile, Paul Romer has come back to this topic many times, and his latest, as of now, http://paulromer.net/the-norms-of-politics-ferguson-and-ehrlich/, pursues the science / politics point by bringing in two figures whom he criticizes for twisting words for political purposes and not admitting it when caught.
I’m sure you’ve been breathlessly following along with the discussion on “mathiness” that Paul Romer kicked off (see here, here, here). Romer used several growth models to illustrate his point about “mathiness”, and his critique centered around the assumption of price-taking by firms and/or individuals in these papers. His argument was that these papers used “mathiness” as a kind of camouflage for their price-taking assumptions. Romer argues that the reasonable way to understand growth is to allow for market power by some firms and/or individuals over their ideas.
From what I can see, the heart of this is about replication. What Romer has asserted is that any aggregate production function must have constant returns to scale (i.e. be homogenous of degree one) in its rival inputs. The mental exercise here is the following. Imagine that tomorrow there was a perfect replica of the Earth floating next to…
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RIP John and Alicia Nash
I just learned with great sadness that one of the few remaining great minds of the 20th Century died. John F. Nash, who did so much to put Game Theory on a spectacularly successful growth path, was killed in a taxi cab accident, together with his wife Alicia. He was 86 and she was 82. Obituaries are in many news websites. The New York Times offered this one, while Philly.com offered this one.
Without John Nash’s genius, my entire academic field would have been a much less vibrant and useful one. While the news tells us about the movie A Beautiful Mind, the means by which most people would have known about Nash and his travails with schizophrenia, the news of this accident hits particularly hard those of us who teach and use game theory all the time, writing paper after paper, in the hundreds of thousands, using Nash’s contributions to game theory.
Rest in Peace, Alicia and John Nash. You left the world a better place.
Prisoner’s Dilemma games and the environment
Several days ago I commented on this post by my friend Novita Listyani from Bali. In my comment I promised an explanation of what I designated as the “bad game” that has trapped the customs of Balinese bird-trappers and prevents them from simply listening to the heart of a nature lover like Novita and free the birds they have trapped. This is the promised explanation, coming a little late because of some adventures with a stomach virus that you don’t need to read details about.
I will start with a story that features at the very beginning of a very good graduate microeconomics textbook by Samuel Bowles, Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution. The story is this, in the words of Bowles:
“..Like the overnight train that left me in an empty field some distance from the settlement, the process of economic development has for the most part bypassed the two hundred or so families that make up the village of Palanpur. They have remained poor, even by Indian standards: less than a third of the adults are literate, and most have endured the loss of a child to malnutrition or to illnesses that are long forgotten in other parts of the world. But for the occasional wristwatch, bicycle, or irrigation pump, Palanpur appears to be a timeless backwater, untouched by India’s cutting edge software industry and booming agricultural regions.
Seeking to understand why, I approached a sharecropper and his three daughters weeding a small plot. The conversation eventually turned to the fact that Palanpur farmers sow their winter crops several weeks after the date at which yields would be maximized. The farmers do not doubt that earlier planting would give them larger harvests, but no one the farmer explained, is willing to be the first to plant, as the seeds on any lone plot would be quickly eaten by birds. I asked if a large group of farmers, perhaps relatives, had ever agreed to sow earlier, all planting on the same day to minimize losses. “If we knew how to do that,” he said, looking up from his hoe at me, “we would not be poor.””
The crux of the problem is that these farmers are trapped playing a prisoner’s dilemma. The first description of this kind of game was given in 1950, early in the days of the formal development of game theory. The game was first described via a story of two prisoners who were arrested and interrogated separately for a particular crime. The prosecutor can bring a lesser charge against each prisoner without obtaining more evidence from their confessions, but if the prosecutor can get one of them to confess to the main crime he thinks they have committed, then he can get a conviction for this more serious crime.
To induce each prisoner to confess, the prosecutor tells each, separately, that if they confess and the other does not, then the one confessing will get a more lenient sentence. For the sake of argument, suppose that the details are as follows.
- If prisoner A does not confess and prisoner B does not confess, each gets a year in prison.
- If prisoner A confesses and prisoner B does not confess, A gets to go free, while B gets three years in prison.
- If prisoner B confesses and prisoner A does not confess, B gets to go free, while A gets three years in prison.
- If both confess, each gets two years in prison.
Now put yourself in the shoes of any prisoner — the game is symmetric, so let’s imagine you are prisoner A, and everything we say will apply just as well to prisoner B. You try to decide whether to confess or not. There are two possible choices that prisoner B may make: confess, or not confess.
Suppose B is going to confess. Then if you confess, you get two years in prison, and if you do not confess, you get three years in prison. If you think B will confess, clearly it pays to confess also.
Suppose B is going to not confess. Then if you confess, you get to go free, and if you do not confess, you get a year in prison. If you think B will not confess, again it clearly pays to confess.
That prosecutor has set up the situation in a devilishly clever way! The two prisoners would be together better off not confessing, but each one has an obvious incentive to confess no matter what s/he expects the other prisoner to do.
So what, you might say. I started talking about bird trappers in Bali, and now I am muttering about prisoners. What gives? And what on earth does the story of the poor farmers in Palanpur have to do with any of this?
It all has to do with the “invisible hand” and its failure. Adam Smith, the grandpa of modern economics, made a famous analogy to an invisible hand that guides the independent decisions of people participating in competitive markets to result in a socially optimal outcome, despite the selfish motivations of these people. In Adam Smith’s own words,
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. (Adam Smith, 1776, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, par. IV.2.9) Source
The general overconfidence of conservatively-minded politicians on markets is attributed to this statement and subsequent mathematical proofs of it, all relying on individuals participating in competitive markets. The prisoner’s dilemma game is a thorn in the side of such believers in market magic. In the prisoner’s dilemma, the players are not in a competitive market (one with many buyers and sellers) and their actions directly affect each other. Their incentives are set up so that the tantalizingly possible mutually best outcome (each in prison only for one year) is unattainable when each makes the decision to confess or not independently of the other (and there is no market price to coordinate these decisions).
A little thought will now reveal to you why I told you the Palanpur story. Think of each farmer as a prisoner. Confessing is equivalent to planting too late. Not confessing is equivalent to planting early. You can see that all farmers would be better off planting early, on the same day. But each has a strong incentive to delay, no matter what the other farmers do. So the farmers stay poor, even if a better way is available to them, if only they could somehow tie their decisions to each other’s!
Back to the bird trappers of Bali: they are also playing a version of the prisoner’s dilemma game. (This dismaying game is in fact very prevalent in real-life interactions, and you can find it at the bottom of many such interactions if you keep your eyes peeled for it.) Each bird trapper may well want to release the birds that he has trapped. But then he expects other trappers to trap them! So, why bother?
The prisoner’s dilemma game is a staple of the discussion of environmental issues since at least Russell Hardin’s famous “Tragedy of the Commons” paper. It’s worth mentioning, however, that Elinor Ostrom, the one and only (so far) female winner of the Bank of Sweden Prize in Honor of Alfred Nobel for Economics (in 2009) built her career by finding and analyzing ways that various societies have developed to evade the tragedy of the commons. I am lecturing on Ostrom’s work in my graduate class on mechanism design these days, and I want to say very much more about it, but it will have to wait for the next post on this blog, as this post is pushing up against 1,500 words already. Meanwhile, here is Ostrom’s Nobel Prize speech.
Scary drought in California continues
I read things like this Mashable article about the California drought and think more and more that even though my field is not environmental economics, I should move to this area and use my game theoretic and mechanism design knowledge if I am to do something useful for humanity in the rest of my career.
Discord about econ discourse
I just read this good post (which I discovered from a tweet by Claudia Sahm, @Claudia_Sahm on Twitter) about why academic economists don’t participate much in public discourse. It is aimed at UK academics, but to some extent applies elsewhere, too. The main point is that the incentives are all wrong, as the only thing UK universities want from faculty members is a stream of publications in esteemed journals, and furthermore academics can be awful at explaining to the general public their subject matter (and the general public wants to hear from journalists who pose as experts anyway, independently of whether these get things right).
Danny Blanchflower remarked on Twitter that UK economic discourse lacked much engagement from academics. This was a follow-up to a Paul Krugman post where he disparaged UK economic discourse, and used as his metric the fact that there was a lot of focus on the deficit. And that in turn derives from Simon Wren Lewis’ developing caricature of UK’s ‘mediamacro’.
Well, this blog is about why – supposing the assessment of our discourse to be true, which I don’t really accept in the way it was put – you shouldn’t blame the academics. Or perhaps anyone, except the market.
The first reason why is that there is little or no financial incentive to take part.
UK economics departments are partly assessed on ‘impact’. But there is almost no link to that and me, for example, piling into a debate about whether inflation 2pp below the BoE’s target is, as George…
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